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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises out a final judgment by the trial court on the issue of whether the 
Appellant, THOMPSON DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
(hereinafter "Thompson Development") is entitled to the agricultural exemption for its farmland 
as provided under I.e. § 63-604 for the tax years 2009 and 2010. While several issues were 
raised by the Respondent during the proceedings below, the trial court made its determination 
based upon the issue of zoning, finding that the local zoning ordinance prohibited agricultural 
use on the farmland and therefore no exemption could be granted. Appellant argues that the 
zoning does not prohibit agricultural use of the farmland, and in the alternative, if the zoning 
ordinance is found to prohibit agricultural use, such prohibition is a violation of Thompson 
Development's due process rights and therefore is invalid. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
Thompson Development appealed its 2009 tax assessment, which denied the agricultural 
exemption for a portion of its farmland, to the Latah County Board of Equalization (hereinafter 
"BOE"). A hearing was held in front of the BOE for the 2009 assessment on June 29, 2009. (R. 
Vol. II, pg. 228) The BOE upheld the Assessor's denial of the agricultural exemption and 
Thompson Development appealed to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (hereinafter "BTA"). BTA 
held a hearing on the matter and issued a final decision and order upholding the BOE's decision 
for the 2009 tax year. BTA's decision however was not rendered until after the deadline for 
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contesting the 2010 tax year assessments. The County again denied the agricultural exemption 
for the same portion of Thompson Development's property for tax year 2010. Thompson 
Development appealed the 2010 tax assessment to the BOE and a hearing was held on July 12, 
2010. Because BTA had not made a decision on the 2009 tax year appeal, the BOE again denied 
the exemption for 2010. The BTA then issued a decision dated July 12,2010, affirming the 
BOE's decision and denying the agricultural exemption. (R. Vol. I, pg. 21) Thompson 
Development then filed two Petitions for Judicial Review on August 20, 2010: one appealing 
BTA's decision for the 2009 tax year (Latah County Case No. 2010-00890); and the other 
appealing the BOE's decision for the 2010 tax year (Latah County Case No. 2010-00891). The 
Petitions were consolidated by the trial court on December 22, 2010. (R. Vol. I, pg. 50) 
Thompson Development and the Respondent both filed motions for summary judgment with the 
trial court on December 22,2010 and December 23, 2010, respectively. Multiple hearings were 
held on the motions and ultimately the trial court rendered a decision granting summary 
judgment to the County and denying Thompson Development the agricultural exemption on June 
30,2011. A Notice of Appeal was timely filed and the issue is now before this Court. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Thompson family has owned and farmed hundreds of acres in and adjacent to the City 
of Moscow for well over 50 years, including the farmland that is the subject of this appeal. (R. Vol. 
II, pg. 218, P. 9) The farmland in question is part of a platted subdivision approved by the City 
of Moscow in 2008 and slated to be ultimately developed and sold for residential building lots, 
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commonly known as Phases I-III ofIndian Hills VI Addition to the City of Moscow. See 
Appendix A for a copy of the recorded plat. (R. Vol. I, pgs. 77-78) All three phases are 
contiguous, adjacent, and connected to one another and combined total approximately 13.88 
acres in size as of January 1,2009, and 15.97 acres in size as of January 1,2010. 1 (R. Vol. I, pg. 
74, P. 6) See Appendix B for an illustration of the farmland in Indian Hills VI Addition. (R. Vol. 
II, pg. 199) Additionally, these approximately 15 acres are contiguous, adjacent, and connected 
to nearly four hundred acres of property owned and farmed by the Thompson family, principals 
and predecessors in interest to Thompson Development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 7) 
The County denied the agricultural exemption on the 31 lots in Phase I still owned by 
Thompson Development (of the original 39 lots). (R. Vol. I, pg. 33) These 31 lots have a 
combined total area of 4.91 acres. The 4.91 acres so identified by the County are hereafter 
referred to as the "Target Property," and the combined three phases, including the Target 
Property, and constituting approximately 15 acres, are hereafter referred to as the "Entire 
Property." The County assessed additional tax on the Target Property based on a residential 
valuation, without the benefit of the agricultural exemption, and Thompson Development paid 
the County $59,476.48, over and above the amount it otherwise would have been required to pay 
if the agricultural exemption had been recognized. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 19) 
I As of December 31, 2008, the Petitioner owned 13.8 acres, consisting of Phase I lots and the majority of Phase II 
and Phase III lots. Approximately 9 parcels were inadvertently left out of the December 31, 2008 deed and were 
later conveyed to the Petitioner upon discovery in 2009. Further, seven lots were sold in the subdivision from 2008 
through December 31, 2009. As of January I, 2009, the Petitioner owned 13.88 acres. Additional lots were 
conveyed to Petitioner in September 2009, resulting in Petitioner owning 15.97 acres as of January I, 2010. The 
Petitioner's principals and related family businesses own the adjacent approximately 400 acres. (R. Vol. I, pg., 
74). 
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Although infrastructure improvements have been installed in a portion of the Target 
Property, Thompson Development used, prepared, and dealt with the entire 15 acre parcel in 
customary and reasonable fashion for agricultural purposes during relevant times in 2008 through 
2010. Thompson Development and its principals and predecessors in interest have farmed the 
property, along with approximately 400 adjacent acres of ground, for over 50 years. (R. Vol. I, pg. 
74, P. 7) (R. Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 9) In early 2008, Thompson Development sought and obtained 
approval for phased development of the ground, and began some preparatory development work 
and sold a few lots. Thompson DeVelopment has continued to view and use the remaining lots as 
farm ground, with some intermittent, forward-looking preparatory work being done for future 
residential use in and around farming cycles and farming operations. The infrastructure 
improvements performed on the 4.91 acres denied by the County, were done at times when no 
specific agricultural work was needed during customary agricultural cycles. Ultimately, the ground 
was properly prepped and crops were ultimately farmed, on the property during relevant times, and 
the ground qualified for the exemption. (R. Vol. 1, pgs. 74-75) 
The infrastructure work that was done to improve the public rights of way located in the 
Target Property consisted of paving the public streets, and installing sidewalks and utilities 
within the rights of way (which are not owned by Thompson Development and therefore are not 
part of the Target Property) and to the lot boundaries in the Target Property. (R. Vol. II, pg. 187, 
P. 6-7) None of the infrastructure improvements installed in the Target Property interfere with 
the typical farming operations of Thompson Development. (R. Vol. II, pg. 187, P. 6-8) 
Thompson Development directed the contractor installing the improvements to be sure to leave 
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the Target Property ground in proper condition to continue the traditional farming operations that 
had been done there and would continue to be done there. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 10) In the fall of 
2008, the Target Property, like the rest of the Entire Property, was prepared for spring planting in 
customary fashion. That fall, Thompson Development chisel plowed most of the Entire 
Property, including the Target Property, in further preparation for spring planting and also to 
help contain runoff, all of which are customary farming practices and purposes. In the spring of 
2009, the Entire Property was planted in spring wheat. In the summer of2009, the Entire 
Property spring wheat was harvested. In the fall of2009, the stubble was left standing on the 
Entire Property for erosion control as is a customary practice. In the spring of 20 10, 
approximately five acres, including the Target Property, was seeded to grass for grass-hay 
production, and the remainder of the Entire Property was planted in peas. (R. Vol. I, pgs. 74-75, 
Ps. 11-18) 
In the summer of 2010, the approximately five acres seeded to grass-hay was not cut 
because feed hay is not customarily cut the first year in order to allow for proper plant 
development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 17) In 2010, the remainder of the Entire Property was 
harvested. 
The County has never alleged or stated that the Target Property failed to produce a yield 
of grain or feed crops for tax years 2009 and 2010. 
It is undisputed that Target Property consists of three separate zoning designations: 
Moderate-Density Residential, Medium-Density Residential and Multiple-Family Residential under 
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the City of Moscow Zoning Code. Thompson Development recorded two different sets of 
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions to represent the zoning designations. Both sets of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, recognize Thompson Development's right to continue 
agricultural use of each lot up until the time it is transferred to a buyer for residential purposes. 
In relevant part, they provide: "Each owner of each lot hereby acknowledges that it is adjacent to 
farmland and that Declarant intends to continue to farm said farmland for the foreseeable future. 
Each owner further agrees not to take any action that would impede the Declarant's farming 
operation." (R. Vol. I, pg. 82, Art. III, P. 3; pg. 89, Art. III, P. 2) The covenants further state 
that the Declarant [Thompson Development] reserved the right to farm the adjacent property: 
"FURTHERMORE, it is understood that the Declarant owns the adjacent farmland and may 
develop said land. In the meantime, however, Declarant shall continue farming the land. Lot 
owners agree not to impede in the development or farming ofthe land by the Declarant." (R. 
Vol. I, pg. 87, Art. VIII, P. 4; pg. 94, Art. VIII, P. 4) 
The trial court determined that the City of Moscow's Zoning Code prohibited agricultural 
use of the Target Property based upon its zoning designations. The City of Moscow's Zoning 
Code states in part that the zoning code is an exclusive zoning ordinance, "wherein the stated 
uses are the only uses which are permitted in each zoning district." (Title 4, Sec.II-5, Moscow 
Zoning Code) Agricultural use is not a specifically permitted use under the Target Property's 
zoning designations. (Title 4, Sections 2-6 (B), 2-7 (B), 2-8 (B), Moscow Zoning Code) The City 
of Moscow's Zoning Code also has a provision for legal non-conforming uses, which states that 
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the use cannot be discontinued for a period of more than 30 days or the right to the continued use 
is extinguished. (Title 4, Section 1-8, Moscow Zoning Code) 
The City's Zoning Administrator, Bill Belknap, determined that Thompson Development 
was not in violation of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code because any period of 
'discontinuance' referred to in 2008, was not dissimilar from common and typical agricultural 
practices. (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 3) Mr. Belknap explained: "Further, no new use was established 
that formally extinguished the prior historical agricultural use." Id. 
The County originally represented to Thompson Development's legal counsel that the 
Target Property would be given the agricultural exemption if the Target Property was farmed. 
(R. Vol. I, pgs. 99-100, P. 2-4) The property was farmed, and the County subsequently denied 
the agricultural exemption. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Was the Target Property actively devoted to agriculture and therefore entitled to 
the agricultural exemption under Idaho Code §§ 63-602K and 63-604 for tax 
years 2009 and 201 O? 
II. Does the City of Moscow's Zoning Code prohibit agricultural use of the Target 
Property and therefore prevent Thompson Development from qualifYing for the 
agricultural exemption? 
III. Does application of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code violate Thompson 
Development's due process rights? 
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IV. Whether or not the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson 
Development an agricultural exemption on the Target Property. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case is an appeal of the grant of a summary judgment motion. "On an appeal from the 
grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard 
used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Boise Tower Assoc., LLC v. 
Hogland. 147 Idaho 774, 779 (2009). Summary judgment is appropriate" if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c) If the evidence presented shows no disputed issues of material 
fact, then all that remains are questions of law, over which this Court exercises free review. 
Mendenhall v. Aldous. 146 Idaho 434, 436 (2008). "The Supreme Court exercises free review 
over issues of statutory interpretation." Taylor v. Maile. 146 Idaho 705, 711 (2009). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Target Property was actively devoted to agriculture and was entitled to 
the agricultural land exemption under Idaho Code §§63-602K and 63-604 for tax years 
2009 and 2010. 
Idaho Code § 63-602K identifies property exempt from taxation, including the 
speculative portion of land actively devoted to agriculture. Idaho Code § 63-604 defines' land 
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actively devoted to agriculture' and sets forth additional requirements for the exemption, stating 
in relevant part as follows: 
(1) For property tax purposes, land which is actively devoted to agriculture shall 
be eligible for appraisal, assessment and taxation as agricultural property each 
year it meets one (1) or more of the following qualifications: 
(a) The total area of such land, including the homesite, is morc than five (5) 
contiguous acres, and is actively devoted to agriculture which means: 
(i) It is used to produce field crops including, but not limited to, grains, feed 
crops, fruits and vegetables; 
(7) As used in this section: 
(a) "Contiguous" means being in actual contact or touching along a boundary or at a 
point, except no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by reason of a 
roadway or other right-of-way. 
I.C. § 63-604. 
A. Total Area Requirement 
It is undisputed by the County that the Entire Property exceeds 10 acres in total area. In 
determining whether farmland meets the threshold of five acres, adjacent, contiguous acreage 
can be included. 
The County unilaterally attempted to carve out, or target, the Target Property and 
consider it separately from the rest of the Entire Property for the purposes of the agricultural 
exemption without lawful effect or justification. The Target Property is clearly contiguous with 
the rest of the Entire Property. '''Contiguous,' means being in actual contact or touching along a 
boundary or at a point, except "no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by 
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reason of a roadway or other right-of-way."" I.C. § 63-604(7)(a) The Target Property is in 
actual contact with and touches the remainder of the Entire Property at several points and along 
several boundary segments. (See Appendix A, also R. Vol. I, pg. 77) Additionally, the County 
has not challenged the overall accuracy of the map and its depiction of contiguous lands. 
Finally, Appendix A is a self-authenticating record of survey kept in the records of the Latah 
County Recorder. 
The designation of the Target Property as part of "Phase I" by Thompson Development 
and the County is solely for the purposes of the future residential development use ofthe 
property, and the designation of assessment parcels by the County is for the convenience of the 
Assessor. Neither purpose for the artificial targeting and segregation of the Target Property is 
determinative under I.C. § 63-604. Nowhere in the definition of contiguous acreage or the five 
acre requirement does section 63-604 state that the property must also be designated all within 
one Assessor parcel designation or subdivision designation. In fact, the legislature in 2006 
amended section 63-604, in part, by adding subsection 6 to prevent these sorts of development 
designations from defeating the agricultural exemption. Subsection 6 provides: "For purposes of 
this section, the act of platting land actively devoted to agriculture does not, in and of itself, 
cause the land to lose its status as land being actively devoted to agriculture if the land otherwise 
qualifies for the exemption under this section." I.C. § 63-604(6) (emphasis added) The 
legislature also included the same language in I.C. § 63-602K(2). Therefore, designations made 
for future residential development use are not controlling for the purposes ofI.C. § 63-604, and 
the Target Property is not separate from the Entire Property. The 5-acre issue is a red herring. 
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Adopting the County's argument on this issue would lead to absurd results. If the County 
were allowed to simply designate areas of ground less than 5 acres in size as separate parcels and 
deny the exemption, then the entire statutory scheme established by the legislature would be 
obliterated, and the result would be absurd. The County could, by fiat, designate a 100-acre 
perfectly square portion of farm ground as being 25 parcels 4 acres in size, and therefore destroy 
the exemption for an entire 100-acre parcel that should otherwise be exempt under the legislative 
framework. "Rules of statutory construction dictate that a reviewing court shall not interpret a 
statute in a manner that leads to an absurd result." State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 
520,535 (2010) (citing In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 680 (2008)) 
Further, it appears the County denied the agricultural exemption on the Target 
Property because infrastructure improvements had been installed in that portion of the 
subdivision. Because of the infrastructure improvements and platting, the County claims 
that the use of the Target Property is predominantly residential, even though the Target 
Property had never been used for residential purposes. Fortunately for this Court, Idaho 
Code § 63-604 is unambiguous. 
While not controlling, prior decisions from the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals 
support Thompson Development's case. First, the presence of infrastructure 
improvements has no bearing on whether or not an agricultural exemption should be 
granted. The final decision and order of the BTA in the matter ofIdaho Trust Deeds, 
LLC, makes it clear that lots in an improved subdivision are eligible for an agriculture 
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exemption. In fact, that matter is very similar to this case. In that matter, the subject 
property was "25 "unsold" residential lots in two (2) newer subdivisions." (See Appendix 
C, also R. Vol. I, pg. 107) The County in that matter granted an agricultural exemption on 
21 lots, finding that they "had a boundary line, or point in contact, in common with other 
same-ownership land where the total area involved was over five (5) acres." There were 
four other lots, however, that were separated from the 21 lots by a publicly dedicated 
street. The County determined that those four lots were not exempt because they were 
less than five (5) acres, and they were not contiguous to the other 21 lots. The BTA, 
however, determined that those four lots were entitled to the agricultural exemption 
stating in part, "Lots in the same ownership were located directly across the street, which 
all taken together, totaled over five (5) acres in size. Where these "contiguous lots" were 
farmed in an otherwise qualifying manner, they should be granted the agricultural 
exemption." Id. 
While the BT A in that matter specifically focused on the contiguous argument, it 
also found that "platted roadways within the subdivision are developed and owned by the 
government" just as is the case here. Id. The subdivision improvements in that matter 
included the improved streets and utility lines within the roadways. In its decision, the 
BT A found that "The record provided the subject lots were farmed over their surface 
area. There was no indication that subdivision improvements prevented farming." Id. 
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While the County raised the argument that the lots in Phase I of Indian Hills VI Addition 
were "separate not contiguous to--Phases 2 and 3." (R. Vol. I, pg. 129, P. 2), the record shows 
that is clearly not the case. With respect to the land in Phases II and III, the County contradicted 
itself when it acknowledged: "This land is adjacent to the lots in Phase 1." (R. Vol. I, pg. 127, P. 
1) 
Because Phase I is adjacent to and touching Phase II and Phase III and they combined 
consist of over 10 acres of common ownership, the 5-acre threshold requirement of the lead in 
portion of section 63-604(a) is met. Further, the existence of subdivision improvements has no 
bearing on whether or not the lots were farmed. 
B. Production ofField Crops 
Theodore C. Thompson, a principal of Thompson Development, is a 35-year farmer on 
the Palouse region, with detailed and intimate knowledge of customary and acceptable farming 
practices on the Palouse region, as well as markets in and definitions of relevant crops. (R. Vol. 
I, pg. 73; pg. 75, P. 20) He is therefore qualified and competent to testify that the spring wheat 
planted in 2009 and the hay planted in 2010 are respectively a grain and a feed crop. (R. Vol. I, 
pg. 75, P. 21) He is also qualified to testifY that the ground preparation conducted in the fall of 
2008 was within the range of usual and customary ground preparation in anticipation of crops to 
be planted in the spring. (R. Vol. I, pg. 74, P. 11) This activity in 2008 qualifies as "actively 
devoted to agriculture." Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization of Ada County, 136 Idaho 
809, 814 (2001) (holding that fall ground preparation in the year before the tax year in question 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 13 of29 
left the property "actively devoted to agriculture" even though there was no crop actually in the 
ground on January 1 of the tax year in question). Therefore, section 63-604(a)(1) is satisfied. 
Additionally, any arguments by the County attempting to allege that the crops were not 
part of a "bona fide" farming operation would be without merit, irrelevant, and would border on 
frivolous, as Roeder Holdings also made it clear that such a standard was not part of the clear 
statutory framework, which must control the analysis. Roeder at 813-14. The statute simply 
requires the planting of a crop, including preparation under the interpretation of Roeder 
Holdings. The statute has been satisfied. 
C. Covenants Do Not Prohibit Agricultural Use 
The covenants applicable to the Target Property recognize Thompson Development's 
right to continue agricultural use of the Target Property. In relevant part, they provide: "Each 
owner of each lot hereby acknowledges that it is adjacent to farmland and that Declarant intends 
to continue to farm said farmland for the foreseeable future. Each owner further agrees not to 
take any action that would impede the Declarant's farming operation." (R. Vol. I, pg. 82, Art. 
III, P. 3; pg. 89, Art. III, P. 2 ) The covenants further state that the Declarant [Thompson 
Development] reserved the right to farm the adjacent property: "FURTHERMORE, it is 
understood that the Declarant owns the adjacent farmland and may develop said land. In the 
meantime, however, Declarant shall continue farming the land. Lot owners agree not to impede 
in the development or farming of the land by the Declarant." (R. Vol. I, pg. 87, Art. VIII, P. 4; 
pg. 94, Art. VIII, P. 4) 
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At some point in the proceedings below, the County and the trial court made reference to 
the language of the Covenants, and argued that Article III ~2 of the Covenants (R. Vol. I, pg. 89) 
constitutes a restriction contrary to I.C. § 63-604(2). However, when reading covenants, the 
Idaho courts apply ordinary rules of contract construction. Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 
144 Idaho 813, 817 (2007). In construing a contract, the Court must seek to give effect to the 
intention of the parties, which is to be determined by viewing the contract as a whole and in its 
entirety. Clear Lakes Trout Co. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120 (2005). 
The clear meaning and intention behind the Covenants, when considered in their entirety, 
is to recognize and allow agricultural use of each portion of the Target Property up until 
transferred to an end-user for residential use, in which case, the Covenants provide restrictions 
regarding the type of residential structure, as required by the City of Moscow during the platting 
process. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 22-23) Although not binding on this Court, the BTA recognized 
this clear and common-sense understanding of the Covenants, at page 7 of its decision in this 
matter, stating "The record did not demonstrate a clear prohibition to the continued cropland use 
(agricultural use) of the subject lots as of January 1,2009, or subsequent to platting." (R. Vol. I, 
pg. 19, P. 4) This clear and common-sense understanding also comports with the understanding 
and intention of Thompson Development. (R. Vol. I, pg. 75, P. 25) 
This understanding is also consistent with and mandated by the Idaho courts' strict 
interpretation of restrictive covenants. Restrictive covenants are "disfavored" by the Idaho 
courts. Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, 817 (2007); Pinehaven Planning 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 15 of29 
Bd. v. Brooks, l38 Idaho 826, 831 (2003). "The Court will not extend by implication any 
restriction not clearly expressed in the covenants because restrictive covenants are in derogation 
of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes. All doubts must be resolved in favor 
of the free use of land." Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho at 817 (emphasis 
added). 
The clear and logical result is that there are no specific restrictions that run contrary to 
I.C. § 63-604(2) and therefore, the Target Property, as well as the rest of the Entire Property, 
having met the requirements set forth in I.e. § 63-604, qualifies for the agricultural exemption. 
II. Agricultural Use of Subject Property is Not Prohibited under the City of 
Moscow Zoning Code. 
A. Local Zoning Designation o(Subject Property Irrelevant 
The trial court based its decision in this case solely upon the zoning ofthe Target Property. 
The trial court determined that agricultural use was not a permitted use in the Moderate Density, 
Medium Density and Multiple Family Residential zones, and therefore the agricultural use was non-
conforming. The trial court stated: "the nonconforming agricultural use of the 4.91 acres at issue 
here ceased for more than thirty days, and under the clearly stated language of the Moscow City 
Zoning Code, its use must have from that time on conformed to the regulations of the Moscow City 
Zoning Code as it applies to residential property." (R. Vol. II, pg. 285, P. 2) 
The trial inappropriately applied the City of Moscow's Zoning Ordinance to this property. 
The zoning designations of the subject property are irrelevant because Idaho Code specifically 
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prohibits local zoning ordinances from preventing or closing agricultural operations. The legislature 
has gone to great lengths to protect agricultural operations and continues to do so under the Right to 
Farm Act found in I.C. § 22-4501 et seq. The legislature wanted to prevent the premature removal 
oflands from agricultural uses, and therefore passed legislation that would reduce the loss of those 
agricultural resources to the state. Idaho Code § 22-4501 specifically states: "The legislature also 
finds that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the 
state ofIdaho." 
To address the potential impact oflocal ordinances on agricultural operations, the 
legislature clarified its goal under I.C. § 22-4504, which states: 
No city, county, taxing district or other political subdivision of this state 
shall adopt any ordinance or resolution that declares any agricultural 
operation operated in accordance with generally recognized agricultural 
practices to be a nuisance nor shall any zoning ordinance that forces the 
closure of any such agricultural operation be adopted. Zoning and 
nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations that were 
established outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were 
incorporated into the municipality by annexation. The county planning 
and zoning authority may adopt a nuisance waiver procedure to be 
recorded with the county recorder or appropriate county recording 
authority pursuant to residential divisions of property. (emphasis added) 
Agricultural operation as defined in the Right to Farm Act includes the growing, raising 
or production of agricultural crops, including field grains, seeds, and hay (I.C. § 22-4502 (1 )). 
Under the Right to Farm Act, agricultural use is a permitted use throughout the State of 
Idaho, and any local ordinances which prohibit agricultural use or effectively prevent the 
continuation of agricultural operations are unenforceable. The County argued that the Right to 
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Farm Act is intended to protect existing farms from nuisance claims. However, to construe such 
purpose so narrowly is to disregard the entire language ofI.C § 22-4501. Despite Thompson 
Development's arguments, the trial court failed to address the language: "The legislature also finds 
that the right to farm is a natural right and is recognized as a permitted use throughout the state of 
Idaho." 
Further, zoning ordinances do not apply to agricultural operations that were established 
outside the corporate limits of a municipality and then were incorporated into the municipality by 
annexation. In this case, the subject property has been owned and used for agricultural operations by 
the Thompson family for over 58 years. (R. Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 9) The property was previously 
located outside the city limits, and was annexed into the city sometime between 1970 and 1981. (R. 
Vol. II, pg. 218, P. 11) Accordingly, the zoning ordinance does not apply to this property. 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the Right to Farm Act is intended to prevent counties and 
cities from prohibiting agricultural use of property. The Right to Farm Act is not the only statute 
which promotes the protection of agricultural activities. The Local Land Use Planning Act was also 
intended to encourage protection of agricultural lands for production of food. (I.C. § 67-6502 (e)). 
Idaho Code § 67-6529 goes even further and states that no county board of commissioners may 
adopt an ordinance or resolution which "deprives any owner of full and complete use of agricultural 
land for production of any agricultural product." That code states that 'agricultural land' shall be 
defined by local ordinance or resolution. The trial court interprets this to mean that since the City of 
Moscow Zoning Code has designated the Target Property as appropriate for residential purposes, it 
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inversely means that it is not agricultural land. However, allocating residential zoning districts does 
not define agricultural land. Phases II and III both consist of agricultural land, yet are zoned under 
the residential zoning districts of the City of Moscow. It is the use of the land which defines it as 
agricultural. In this case, the City of Moscow Zoning Code does not apply under the Right to Farm 
Act as this is property that was continuously farmed and then annexed into the City. 
B. Absent Statutory Authority, Agricultural Use o[Property Would QualifY as a Legal 
Noncontorming Use 
Even if the legislature had not specifically stated that agricultural use was a permitted use 
throughout the state of Idaho under the Right to Farm Act, the local zoning ordinances do not 
prohibit Thompson Development from farming its property as a legal non-conforming use. Bill 
Belknap, the Community Development Director who also acts as the Zoning Administrator for the 
City of Moscow conducted a factual inquiry into the activity of the property, and determined that 
Thompson Development was not in violation of the City of Moscow's Zoning Code. Mr. Belknap 
appropriately found that the historical use had not been terminated. "Further, no new use was 
established that formally extinguished the prior historical agricultural use. Therefore our office finds 
that the agricultural use occurring within Indian Hills Sixth Addition is a legal non-conforming use 
of the subject property and not in violation of the City's Zoning Code." (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 3) 
Title 4, Section 1-8 of the Zoning Code provides for legal non-conforming uses. That code 
section provides that a use that was allowed prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance which after 
its adoption would no longer be allowed, may continue as a legal nonconforming use. The code 
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further states that if the legal non-conforming use is discontinued for a period of30 days, then the 
use would no longer qualifY as a legal nonconforming use. The trial court noted that because there 
was no agricultural activity observed from the time the property was rezoned in early 2008 through 
the fall of 2008 when the property was prepared for spring planting, the agricultural use of the 
property no longer qualified under the historic use exception. The trial court further noted that it is 
not bound by Mr. Belknap's determination. 
However, the trial court failed to take into account two essential factors in its analysis. First, 
a crop does not have to be harvested for the property to be continuously used for agricultural 
purposes. Idaho Code § 63-604 recognizes this as it allows for agricultural exemptions for 
properties which are in a crop retirement or rotation program. (See LC. § 63-604 (1) (a)(iv)). It is 
common practice for farmers to allow farm ground to lie fallow for one or more seasons. Second, it 
is unreasonable to apply a 30 day time period to agricultural operations when it comes to 
determining whether or not a use has been discontinued for purposes of establishing a legal 
nonconformity. In a typical crop year, farmland is not ordinarily 'used' for periods of time 
exceeding 30 days; for instance, between spring harvest and fall planting. Just because there is not a 
crop in the ground, does not mean that the agricultural use of the property has been discontinued as 
is anticipated by this code. Mr. Belknap appropriately used reason and logic when he determined 
that the 30 day time period noted in Zoning Code Section 1-8 relating to legal nonconforming uses 
is not appropriately applied to agricultural uses. Mr. Belknap's interpretation and analysis of Title 
4, Section 1-8 of the Zoning Code is nearly identical to this Court's analysis in Roeder Holdings. In 
Roeder Holdings, this Court underwent the same process when it reviewed I.e. § 63-602Y. That 
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code section stated that property must meet exemption requirements as of the first day of January of 
each year the exemption is requested. The county in that case argued that there was no crop in the 
ground on January 1, therefore the property was not used for producing field crops and did not 
qualifY for the agricultural exemption under I.C. § 63-604. This Court determined that January 1 
was not the appropriate date for assessment purposes when it comes to the agricultural exemption 
because it is not typical farming practice to have crops in the ground on January 1. Roeder 
Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Equalization, 136 Idaho 809, 814 (2001) . 
Both Mr. Belknap and this Court in Roeder used a common sense, reasonable analysis 
when interpreting the respective code provisions. The same applies in this case. It is not appropriate 
to use a 30 day time period for 'use' when it comes to determining if agricultural use offarmland 
was discontinued for purposes of establishing a legal nonconformity. In fact, applying the trial 
court's and the County's interpretation of the City's Zoning Code in this case would lead to absurd 
results; all farmland in the city would be subject to losing their protected non-conforming use rights 
solely based upon typical farming practices. 
Fortunately, the legislature has clearly stated that agricultural use is permitted throughout 
the state of Idaho as a natural right - therefore, the City's Zoning Code, if interpreted to disallow 
agricultural uses, is not only a violation of the state code but also of the Idaho Constitution (Article 
XII Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, states that an incorporated city may make and enforce 
regulations that are not in conflict with the general laws ). 
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C. De{erence Should be Given to the Zoning Administrator's Decision 
During the proceedings below the trial court noted that it is not bound by Mr. Belknap's 
detennination that Thompson Development's agricultural use of the subject property was not in 
violation of the Zoning Code. Mr. Belknap had issued a letter of detennination in response to a 
complaint alleging Thompson Development's agricultural use of the property was a violation of the 
City Zoning Code. After a factual investigation, Mr. Belknap noted that Thompson Development's 
agricultural use of the property was not in violation of the City's Zoning Code. While the trial court 
was correct in that Mr. Belknap's decision was not binding on the trial court; it is well reasoned that 
an agency's interpretation of its own zoning regulations should be given deference: " ... 'there is a 
strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which includes the 
application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. '" Terrazas v. Blaine County ex. 
reI. Board of Commissioners. 147 Idaho at 197,207 P.3d at 173 (2009) (quoting Payette River 
Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 554, (1999)). This 
Court in Chisholm v. Twin Falls County gave deference to that County's interpretation of its own 
zoning ordinance articulating the exact same presumption. In that case, this Court detennined 
that the County's interpretation was not capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory; and therefore the 
Court deferred to the County's interpretation. Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 
75 P.3d 190 (2003). 
While Mr. Belknap is not a 'zoning board', he is the Zoning Administrator tasked by the 
City of Moscow's Zoning Code to respond to all questions regarding the interpretation of Moscow's 
Zoning Code. (Title 4, Sec. 11-1, Moscow Zoning Code) Also, under Title 4, Section 11-5, the 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 22 of29 
Zoning Administrator is tasked with discretion regarding authorized uses. Specifically, that Section 
states in part, "Further, when, as a result of subsequent changes in technology, business practice, or 
lifestyle, a use has not been mentioned in this Zoning code, the Zoning Administrator or designee 
may permit such use if it is clear that the use is comparable to listed uses for a particular zoning 
district." In his letter, Mr. Belknap made a point to reference the "compatibility of the non-
conforming use with adjacent land uses and the greater public purpose or good of a particular 
application of the Zoning Code ... The community and the City have historically promoted the 
continuation of farming in locations in and around the City as a productive means of land 
stewardship." (R. Vol. II, pg. 224, P. 2) It is clear that under the City of Moscow's Zoning Code, the 
Zoning Administrator does have discretion regarding authorized uses and Mr. Belknap's position is 
that the agriculture use of the Target Property is not in violation of the City Code. 
Mr. Belknap further conducted his own factual investigation prior to making his 
determination. Like the County in Chisholm, Mr. Belknap's interpretation was not capricious, 
arbitrary or discriminatory. As such, his decision should be given deference. In this case, the state 
legislature has effectively removed all questions regarding the interpretation of local ordinances on 
agricultural operations and therefore Mr. Belknap's determination, while appropriately reasoned and 
accurate as presented, is pre-empted by state code. 
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III. Prohibiting agricultural use of the Target Property by application of the City 
of Moscow Zoning Code is a violation of Thompson Development's due process rights. 
As noted above, in the event the City of Moscow's Zoning Code does apply, Thompson 
Development's use of the Target Property for agricultural operations is protected as a non-
conforming use. The 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Sec. 
13 of the Idaho Constitution both protect an individual's right to continue a "nonconforming 
use". Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 244 P.3d 174, 178 (2010) (quoting O'Connor v. City of 
Moscow. 69 Idaho 37, 42-43, (1949). A nonconforming use is "a use ofland which lawfully 
existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective 
date of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Id. (quoting Baxter v. 
City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09 (] 989). Generally, nonconforming uses are allowed to 
continue after a new zoning ordinance is enacted. Id This is intended to protect "the owner from 
abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity on the property. The 
protection does not extend beyond this purpose." Id. (quoting Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 
Idaho 307, 309 (Ct App. 1983)) In general, nonconforming uses "should not be allowed to 
expand and eventually should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 396, 398 
(1974). 
Accordingly, a nonconforming use may be lost if it is enlarged or expanded in violation 
of a valid zoning ordinance. Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609. This Court in Baxter adopted a flexible 
approach that focuses on the character of the alleged enlargement or expansion on a case-by-case 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 24 of29 
basis.Id. In that analysis this Court focused on the particular character of the nonconforming use 
and whether the use was the same before or after the passage of the zoning ordinance. Id. 
This Court in Eddins reiterated the intent of due process: 
Due process protects the fundamental or primary use of the property prior to the 
enactment of a new zoning ordinance; therefore, a nonconforming use is not 
impermissibly enlarged or expanded until there has been some change in the fundamental 
or primary use of the property. Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 178 (2010) 
This Court in Eddins found that the fundamental or primary use of Eddins' real property 
both before and after the ordinance was passed was to rent spaces for manufactured homes 
and recreational vehicles. In which case, the use of the real property was protected by the due 
process clauses ofIdaho and the U.S. Constitutions. Id. at 179. 
This Court found that including the manufacturing of crypts in the operation of a 
cemetery was an intensification of its use, but was not a basic change in the fundamental or 
primary use of the real property in question. Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, Inc., v. City of 
Lewiston, 99 Idaho 680, 680 (1978). 
This Court also found that replacement of obsolescent equipment with modem equipment 
for a business did not constitute an enlargement or expansion of that use. Gordon Paving Co. v. 
Blaine Cty. Bd ofCty. Comm'rs, 98 Idaho 730, 731 (1977). This Court pointed out "[b]oth 
before and after the modifications [the paving company] was engaged in asphalt production by 
the same basic process. As a matter oflaw, no change of use has occurred." Id. at 732. 
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The main issue consistent in Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, Gordon Paving, and 
Eddins is the focus on whether the uses constituted enlargement or expansion of the 
nonconforming use. In Thompson Development's case, there is no enlargement or expansion of 
use. In fact, there is arguably a decrease in the use because portions of the property that were 
previously farmed were dedicated to the City for public streets, which decreased the size of the 
land used for agricultural operations. It is important to note, the property subject to the tax appeal 
is only the property owned by Thompson Development, and does not include the streets or rights 
of way. 
The trial court stated that Thompson Development terminated its agricultural activities on 
the Target Property, and that Thompson Development's termination of agricultural activities 
constituted a fundamental change in use. (R. Vol. II, pg. 288, P. 4). However, this is inconsistent 
with this Court's analysis in Eddins and Baxter. 
There is no dispute that Thompson Development farmed the Target Property prior to the 
change in the zoning of the property in early 2008. There is no dispute that the Target Property 
was prepped for farming in the fall of 2008 and farmed in the subsequent years. There was no 
harvesting of any crop in the summer of 2008 while the public improvements were installed. 
However, the character of the use of the property before 2008 and in the fall of2008 was the 
same with the exception that there was a little less ground for Thompson Development to farm as 
the platting required the dedication of public rights of way. While some utilities were stubbed 
out along the boundaries of the lots, they did not interfere with the farming of the Target 
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Property. There was no other use of the Target Property between the beginning of 2008 and the 
fall of2008. This is the same analysis used by Mr. Belknap when he made his determination: the 
fundamental and primary use of the Target Property has not changed. 
Because there was clearly no enlargement, expansion, or change in the fundamental or 
primary use of the Target Property, Thompson Development's nonconforming use is protected 
by the due process clauses of the Idaho Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. Based upon 
Thompson Development's right to continue farming the property, and meeting aU of the 
requirements set forth in LC. § 63-604, Thompson Development is entitled to receive the 
agricultural exemption. 
IV. The trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson Development 
an agricultural exemption on the Target Property. 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial Court erred as a matter of law in denying Thompson 
Development an agricultural exemption on the Target Property. 
CONCLUSION 
Thompson Development was entitled to receive the agricultural exemption for the Target 
Property, having qualified for the exemption under LC. § 63-604 for the tax years 2009 and 
2010. Thompson Development paid $59,476.48 in additional taxes due to the erroneous denial of 
the agricultural exemption. (R. VoL I, pg. 75, P. 19) The tax was improperly or illegally assessed 
and collected. This Court should enter an order directing a refund to Thompson Development in 
the amount of $59,476.48. (LC. § 63-3812(c)). This Court should enter ajudgment and order for 
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a refund - this is not discretionary but rather is mandatory once an improper assessment and 
overpayment is found. Canyon County Bd. of Egualization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC, 
143 Idaho 58, 62 (2006). Thompson Development is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on 
the overpayments, from the date of payment. Id. at 62-63; I.e. § 63-1305(2). 
DATED: January 10,2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUSAN R. WILSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
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BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEALS OF IDAHO ) 
TRUST DEEDS, LLC from the decisions of the ) 
Board of Equalization of Twin Falls County for tax ) 
year 200B. ) 
) 
APPEAL NOS. 08-A-2787 
thru OB-A-2B10 
FINAL DECISION 
AND ORDER 
AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION APPEALS 
THESE MA TIERS came on for consolidated hearing November 7, 2008 in Twin Falls, 
Idaho before Hearing Officer Steven Wallace. The full Board participated in this decision. 
Attorney Gary Slette and Managing Member Rick Giesler appeared for Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC. 
Assessor Gerry Bowden, County Prosecutor Matt Pember and Appraiser Supervisor John 
Knapple appeared for Respondent Twin Falls County. These appeals are taken from decisions 
of the Twin Falls County Board of Equalization (BOE) denying the protests of valuation fortaxing 
purposes of properties described by parcel no. on Attachment A. 
The issue on appeaJ is whether farmed ground qualifies as exempt pursuant to 
Section 63-604, I.C., or what is the proper taxable value of exempt "land actively devoted 
to agriculture" pursuant to Section 63-602K. 
The decisions of the Twin Falls County Board of Equalization are modified in part 
and reversed in part. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The subject property is 25 "unsold" residential lots in two (2) newer subdivisions, Belmont 
Stakes and Emerald Heights. All the subject lots, plus some adjoining non subdivision land, are 
tenant farmed. According to the record, the subdivisions' CC&R's do not restrict the present 
agricultural use. Platted roadways within the subdivisions are developed and owned by the 
government The subject lots are generally at, or a little over, one (1) acre in size. 
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Appeal Nos. 08-A-2787 thru 08-", __ •• _." 
The County found 21 lots had a boundary line, or point contact, in common with other 
same-ownership land where the total area involved was overtive (5) acres. These 21 lots were 
exempted pursuant to Section 63-604, I.C.. On these exempt lots Appellant objects to the 
taxable value determination, claiming an over-assessment. 
On the other four (4) subject lots, the County held they were not exempt where the 
contiguous land area was determined to be under fIVe (5) acres. On these non exempted lots 
Appellant seeks the agricultural exemption and a fair determination of taxable value. Taxpayer 
contends the exception in Section 63-604(7)(a) applies to these lots. Consequently the four (4) 
lots should be considered for assessment purposes to be "contiguous" with other same-
ownership land, which all taken together has a total contiguous land area that exceeds the 5-acre 
threshold. 
Taxpayer contends the subject subdivision land should be valued the same as any other 
qualifying cropland, i.e. pursuant to the actual-use-value model provided for in the agricultural 
exemption law. The installation of subdivision improvements and the subsequent impact on 
individual lot values is contended to be a non factor in the determination of taxable value under 
the agricultural exemption. The subdivision improvements considered by the Assessor included 
improved streets and utility lines within those roadways. 
The Assessor calculated an agricultural land value of$1 ,333 per acre. This was the figure 
based solely on the statutory and rule formula. The legal formula is complex. It is summarized 
here as a "use-value" I based on a specially modified income approach, where income is tied to 
a soil type's agricultural production. Land immediately outside the subdivision, that was farmed 
in conjunction with the subdivision ground, had a total assessed value of $1 ,333 per acre. But 
where the 21 Jots were serviced by subdivision improvements, the calculation of taxable value 
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Appeal Nos. 08-A-2787 thru 08-· ______ .. _ 
differed substantially - going as high as $54,000 to $66,000 each for the roughly i-acre lots. 
Respondent reported it had granted an agricultural exemption to the 21 lots. Without the 
agricultural exemption, market value estimates for the 21 lots ranged from about $64,000 to 
$76,000 each. 
In assessing the 21 lots, the Assessor adapted a method of valuation used for non exempt 
subdivision ground. The subdivision market valuation model allocated a percentage of total 
value to various components. For instance, the land cost in a rural subdivision was typically 
found to represent 17% of the total subdivision development costs, utilities were 18%, and so on. 
To grant the agricultural exemption, Le. remove the "speculative value", the County removed 
17% from its full market value estimates for each lot; then replaced the 17% reduction with the 
special use valuation. This produced a taxable value that reflected both the agricultural use plus 
value attributable to the presence of subdivision improvements. 
Respondent's explanation for this special treatment of agricultural land in subdivisions 
implied the improvements were actually located on the lots and owned by the lot Dwner(s). From 
the record however, this did not appear to be the case. Regardless, the tenant farming evidently 
continued right up to, or across, the lot boundary lines. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Board's goal in its hearings is the acquisition of sufficient, accurate evidence to 
support a determination of fair market value or as here exempt status and taxable value. This 
Board, giving ' full opportunity for all arguments and having considered all testimony and 
documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their respective positions, hereby 
enters the following. 
Property is presumed taxable un less expressly exempted. Idaho Code Sections 63-203, 
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Appeal Nos. 08-A-2787 thru 08-'-''' _____ _ 
63-602. Several rules apply in determ ining whether property is entitled to an exemption. Statutes 
granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the State. Tax 
exemptions are narrowly construed, following the "strict but reasonable" rule of statutory 
construction. Ada County Bd. of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202 at 206; 108 P .3d 
349 at 353 (2005). 
Subdivision roadways were in public ownership for both platted subdivisions germane to 
this matter (Belmont Stakes and Emerald Heights). Where a roadway separated privately owned 
lots from one another, the County found the separated lots were not "contiguous" as the private 
ownerships did not meet at the center of the street. Thus the County found four (4) lots did not 
qualify for the agricultural exemption due to size standards. We hold the County reading of 
Section 63-602K(7)(a) was in error. The section provides: 
(7) As used in this section: 
(a) "Contiguous" means being in actual contact or touching along a boundary or 
at a point, except no area of land shall be considered not contiguous solely by 
reason of a roadway or other right-of-way. 
The roadway exception would be superfluous language or a meaningless clause as 
interpreted by the County. If same-owner parcels went to the centerline of a street or right of way 
from opposite sides, then those ownerships would "touch" under the first phrase meaning. The 
County believed the second phrase applied only under the same circumstances as the first, i.e. 
where a "touch" occurred. The "exception" phrase must be interpreted to alter or qualify the first 
part under the expressed circumstaf!ces. It is an exception, i.e. it applies where common 
ownerships do not touch solely by reason of a roadway or other right-of-way. 
The four (4) non exempted lots were contiguous with one another through common 
boundaries and ownerships. r~ot§jfi'.f~s~i~rt1$ bwn~iiihip-were: 166ale(:fdrfeCfft-~c-,ossthErslreet, .f 
.t .,;..-"'_ .... -'" , •• --'- ~ ~ - .,-,' - " ... . - ••• • - ' ~ . • : ; .•• ~ . '", .:... _ • ~ .:. _ '~ : -- :_.'_ •• ' _ • _ ::.' ~: _.'. :; '~ . ~" ')" ._ ' ": - , ~,:: ',~- :" • ~. _ _ ~ :-~. :_" '. 
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Appeal Nos. 08-A-2787 thru 08-_______ _ 
' )Y~ichaUta~~!Qg€;th,~r, to~Ie(foverfive (5) acres'in size. Where~these "coot/guoys Trif$~w¢re 
H • .', ~., _ ,_ ' •• ; • _ ", _". ' .' _ • • •• _ ., 
'farrned)n:anptf1€;{Wi&e qua.lifyingmanner, they should be granted the agricultural e;,(ernption!, 
- --_." . :. - " . . " - . 
Therefore the BOE decision to not exempt four (4) of the subject lots will be reversed. 
The other issue on appeal dealt with the proper calculation of taxable value under the 
agricultural exemption. As noted earlier, the County started with an estimate of the full market 
value for each lot, then made a 17% deduction, then added back an agricultural land value. We 
hold the agricultural land value should have been calculated pursuant to the statutory scheme 
and that this figure alone represented the taxable value of subject lots. See Section 63-602K, 
I.C. and Property Tax Administrative Rules 613, 614 and 645 in IDAPA 35.01.03. 
The taxable value of land actively devoted to agriculture is closely controlled. The 
mechanics of determining taxable value on this partial exemption are complex. It is clear 
however that the "actual use value" or taxable value is not determined by reference to market 
value, but by statute and rule procedure/formula. The speculative portion value results from 
comparing the statutory formula value, Le. the taxable value, with the property's full market value, 
The pertinent exemption law does not provide for or allow a taxable value calculation as 
processed by the County. The record provided the subject lots were farmed over their surface 
area. There was no indication that subdivision improvements prevented farming. 
For the reasons set forth above, the decisions of the Twin Falls County Board of 
Equalization concerning subject lots will be reversed in part and modified in part. 
FINAL ORDER 
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decisions of the 
Twin Falls County Board of Equalization concerning the subject parcels be, and the same hereby 
are, REVERSED in part to grant exemptions and set taxable values on four (4) lots, and 
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Appeal Nos. 08-A-2787 thru 08-J ... ____ _ _ 
MODIFIED in part to reduce taxable values on the remaining 21 lots. See Attachment A for 
specific taxable values ordered by the Board. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any taxes which have been paid in excess of those 
determined to have been due be refunded or applied against other ad valorem taxes due from 
Appellant. 
DATED February 27, 2009 
Attachment A 
Before the Board of Tax: Appeals 
Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC Appeals - Twin Falls County 
Appeal No.1. OB-21. OB-A-2B06 
1. 08-A-27B6 22. 08-A-2B07 
2. 08-A-2787 23. 08-A-280B 
3. 08-A-2788 24.08-A-2B09 
4. 08-A-2789 
5. OB-A-2790 
6. 08-A-2791 
7. 08-A-2792 
B. 08-A-2793 
9. 08-A-2794 
10. 08-A-2795 
11. 08-A-2796 
12. 08-A-2797 
13. 08-A-2798 
14.08-A-2799 
15. 08-A-2800 
16. 08-A-2801 
17. 08-A-2802 
18. 08-A-2803 
19. 08-A-2804 
20. 08-A-2805 
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Parcel No. value set at $1,333 
J;FPOF3090000070A modified, value set at $1,335 
]RPOF1530000220A 
~POF1530000240A 
CRPOF1530000210A 
rRPOF1530000200A 
QRPOF1530000190A 
§f(POF1530000180A 
r RPOF1530000170A 
l RPOF1530000160A 
\RPOF1530000150A 
gRPOF1530000140A 
1 RPOF1530000120A 
yRPOF1530000110A 
§f(POF1530000090A 
RP016210030090A RPOF1530000080A 
withdrawn/dis RPOF1530000070A 
missed RPOF1530000060A 
RPOF309000001 OA RPOF1530000050A 
modified, 
value set at 
$1,354 
RPOF3090000020A 
modified, 
value set at $1,335 
RPOF3090000030A 
modified, 
value set at 
$1,335 
RPOF3090000050A 
modified, 
value set at 
$1,354 
RPOF3090000060A 
modified, 
RPOF1530000040A 
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modified, value set at $1,349 
modified, value set at $3,779 
. modified, value set at $1,349 
modified, value set at $1,375 
modified, value set at $1,338 
modified, value set at $1,380 
reversal, value set at $1,346 
reversal, value set at $1,343 
reversal, value set at $1,340 
reversal, value set at $1,338 
modified, value set at $1,879 
modified, value set at $1,338 
modified, value set at $1,828 
modified, value set at $1,610 
modified, value set at $1,607 
modified, value set at $1,335 
modified, value set at $1,335 
modified, value set at $1,333 
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